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ABSTRACT 
This paper engages with the debate about why the nature of the EU‟s policy portfolio is as it is. It 
does  so  by  taking  cohesion  policy  and  asking  the  question,  why  has  it  come  to  occupy  so 
important  a  position  in  the  EU‟s  policy  portfolio?  It  is  argued  that  the  two  most  common 
conceptually-based  approaches  applied  to  cohesion  policy  –  intergovernmentalism  and 
multilevel governance – do not adequately explain either the timing or the dynamic of cohesion 
policy.  A  model  that  combines  economic  integration  approaches  and  federal  approaches  is 
developed in the paper to provide a basis for a new explanatory framework for the prominent 
position of cohesion in the portfolio. We suggest that our approach – which we call a federal 
integration approach – has the potential to be applied to other policy areas.   
   1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The policy responsibilities of the European Union have greatly expanded over the years. 
Indeed, they have done so to such an extent that the EU now has at least some responsibility in 
just about every sphere of public policy. But the extent of these responsibilities varies greatly, 
with it being very considerable in policy areas such as competition, agriculture and fishing, but 
being only marginal in areas such as education, health, and public order.  
A number of approaches have been advanced and used by academic commentators on the 
EU  to  explain  the  nature  of  the  EU‟s  policy  portfolio.  These  approaches  range  from  the 
application  of  grand  theories  –  notably  intergovernmentalism  and  neofunctionalism  / 
supranationalism  in their various forms – to the identification of specific causational variables – 
such  as  the  interests  of  member  states,  the  influence  of  pressure  groups  and  other  vested 
interests, and the impact of globalisation and of Europeanisation.  
In this paper, we do not question the usefulness of such approaches. On the contrary, we 
readily acknowledge that most of them provide at least some help in trying to understand the 
nature of the EU‟s policy portfolio. But, we suggest that another approach, which we call a 
federal integration approach, also provides helpful insights. We do not claim that this federal 
integration approach explains all aspects of the policy portfolio, but we do claim that it has a 
particularly  strong  explanatory  power.  This  is  so  because,  unlike  the  single  disciplinary 
approaches on which most explanations of the policy portfolio are based, our federal integration 
approach draws from the two key disciplines of politics and economics. More particularly, we 
draw on economic integration theory and federalist theory and suggest that the use of them can 
be combined in such a way as to provide a valuable and persuasive explanatory framework of the 
nature of the EU‟s policy portfolio.  2 
 
It is, of course, not possible here to apply in detail our federal integration approach to all 
of the EU‟s policy areas. What we do, therefore, to illustrate and test our approach, is to apply it 
one key policy area: cohesion policy.  Our starting point here is that the two most prominent 
approaches used to explain the increasingly important position that cohesion policy has assumed 
in the EU over the years – intergovernmentalism and multilevel governance (MLG) – fail to fully 
capture its evolution and its centrality. 
Cohesion policy is an apt policy area to take not only because of its importance but also 
because over the next two-to-three years EU institutions, member state governments, regional 
and  local  governments,  political  party  groups,  and  societal  actors  will  carry  on  an  intense 
dialogue  to  reshape  and  finance  cohesion  policy  under  the  2014-20  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework (MFF). Undoubtedly this will be a highly contested issue, as was demonstrated in the 
autumn of 2010 when many member states began to signal their (often conflicting) preferences 
on the next MFF to the Commission. So, in a joint letter sent to Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso on 18 December, „the big three‟ EU member states – France, Germany and the 
UK – plus Finland and the Netherlands, called for an inflation-adjusted budget freeze in the next 
MFF at  2013 levels.
1 Naturally, the Commission and the Parliament  want no such freeze, and 
nor do the member states that are net beneficiaries of the budget  – which includes all of the 
2004-07 accession states and the Mediterranean states.  With France likely to achieve its goal of 
agriculture continuing to account in the next MFF for about 40 per cent of the annual budget,
2 
and with many new pressing demands on the budget, cohesion policy – which currently accounts 
for about 36 per cent of the annual budget (€51 billion of a total budget of €142 billion in 
commitments in 2011) – will thus be vulnerable to deep cuts.   
                                                           
1   Reuters  News  Service.  States'  Budget  Freeze  Bid  Risks  More  EU  Wrangling.  20  December  2010, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE6BH0KT20101218?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews 
2   S. Pignal, EU Summit: The Budget Elephant in the Room, Financial Times, 17 December 2010. 3 
 
The paper begins by establishing the importance of cohesion policy in the EU‟s policy 
portfolio and by outlining how that importance has grown over the years. In the second section 
of the paper we examine the merits of the two approaches that are most commonly used to 
explain the prominence of cohesion policy – integovernmentalism and multi-level governance. In 
the third section our model of federal integration is developed and applied to cohesion policy.  In 
the final section, we offer some conclusions and consider avenues for future research. 
 
1. The Importance of Cohesion Policy in the EU’s Policy Portfolio 
The promotion of cohesion is one of the most prominent and important of the EU‟s many 
policy responsibilities. It is so for a number of reasons. 
First, cohesion has assumed over the years a greatly increased importance in respect of 
the budgetary expenditure of the European Union. Whilst agriculture policy has decreased in 
importance as a portion of the EU budget – from well over 70 per cent for much of the 1970s and 
early 1980s to just over 40 per cent per annum today – cohesion policy has grown, from a 
modest six per cent just after the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created in 
1975 to a figure that now approaches 40 per cent.   
Second, cohesion policy is quite remarkable in its broad remit, encompassing a very wide 
range  of  EU  policy  activities.  These  include  infrastructure,  telecommunications,  and  jobs 
training. Furthermore, the Commission links many of the EU‟s key broad policy  goals – such as 
expanding diversity in the workplace and promoting environmental conservation and sustainable 
development – to cohesion policy.   
Third,  cohesion  policy  is  in  a  very  real  sense  a  microcosm  of  the  EU‟s  historical 
deepening and widening. In terms of deepening, most of the EU‟s major reforming treaties have 4 
 
solidified  the  EU‟s  commitment  to  economic  and  social  cohesion,  beginning  with  the  Paris 
Treaty  establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  (ECSC)  which  created  the 
European  Social  Fund  (ESF)  to  finance  the  retraining  of  workers  who  would  be  rendered 
permanently redundant by the competitive reforms in coal and steel production. Cohesion policy 
was discussed at the Messina Conference and a reference to it was included in the preamble of 
the EEC Treaty with the signatory states affirming that they were „anxious to strengthen the 
unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences 
existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions‟. EU 
competence in cohesion policy was given a specific treaty basis by the 1986 Single European 
Act – with the addition of a new title to the EEC Treaty headed „Economic and Social Cohesion‟.  
Later treaties have further increased EU competence in cohesion policy with, for example, the 
last of the trio of structural and cohesion funds – the „Cohesion Fund‟ – being established in the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty.  
In terms of widening, cohesion policy has played an important role in each enlargement 
round, beginning with the first round which led to the creation of the ERDF and continuing 
through later rounds which have contributed to the growth and partial re-orientation of cohesion 
policies. We will expand on this relationship between cohesion policy and enlargement in the 
next section of the paper. 
Fourth, and finally, cohesion policy involves, in one way or another, a  direct policy-
making and policy-implementation involvement of an unusually large number of policy actors. 
So, all of the major EU institutions exercise a significant role in at least some aspect of the 
setting,  funding,  implementing,  and  monitoring  of  cohesion  policy.  The  overall  financial 
frameworks  of  cohesion  policy  are  set  by  MFFs,  which  are  made  by  the  Commission,  the 5 
 
Council, the EP, and the European Council. The annual budgetary frameworks for cohesion 
funding are made by the Commission, the Council and the EP. The Council and the EP (with the 
latter‟s  powers  over  cohesion  policy  having  been  considerably  strengthened  by  the  Lisbon 
Treaty)  set  broad  cohesion  objectives,  while  the  Commission  develops  and  promulgates 
guidelines for specific programme opportunities. Beyond the major institutions, the Committee 
of the Regions acts in a consultative capacity on cohesion policy decision-making. Cohesion 
policy also brings together an array of governmental and non-governmental decision-makers at 
member state, regional, and local levels: an aspect of cohesion policy that scholars using the 
MLG approach to analyse the EU have found particularly noteworthy.  
*** 
Over the years, cohesion policy has thus moved from being a rather marginal policy area 
to occupying a very important position in the EU‟s policy portfolio.  Why has this happened? 
 
2. How is the Importance of Cohesion Policy Traditionally Explained? 
There is an extensive body of academic literature that draws on theory to provide insights 
into and to further understanding of the development of EU cohesion policy. So, for example, 
interest group theory, neofunctionalist theory, and institutionalist theory all have things to say in 
this context. But, two „oppositional‟ theories – intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance 
– have provided the framework for most theoretically-based studies of cohesion policy. 
 
2.1 Intergovernmentalism 
Informed  by  international  relations  theory  in  general  and  realism  in  particular, 
intergovernmentalism – which in EU studies is most associated with the pioneering work of 6 
 
Stanley Hoffman
3 and Andrew Moravcsik –
4 is  state-centred, emphasising the importance of 
national governments in negotiating decisional outcomes. It does not view supranational actors 
as significant policy players other than in servicing and implementing capacities. As applied to 
cohesion  policy,  intergovernmental  approaches  are  primarily  concerned  with  describing  and 
explaining  the  bargaining  between  governments  that  intergovernmentalists  see  as  key  in 
determining the existence of cohesion policy and the size of the cohesion budget and cohesion 
allocations.  
The intergovernmentalist perspective lays considerable emphasis on how cohesion policy 
has in large part been developed in response to and has been considerably shaped by enlargement 
rounds. This process began with the establishment of the ERDF, which was a response to the 
1973  enlargement  where  cohesion  issues  featured  prominently  in  the  UK/Denmark/Ireland 
accession negotiations. The British government pressed for a regional fund partly to aid its de-
industrialized regions as compensation for the higher food prices Britons would expect to pay 
upon  entering  the  EEC,  but  also  as  juste  retour  for  the  UK‟s  contribution  to  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Importantly, the British had an ally in the Italians, who had long 
sought an EU-based regional redistribution scheme for the mezzogiorno, but also had support 
from the Irish, who stood to benefit upon their accession.
5 The Mediterranean enlargement round 
of the 1980s – which brought Greece, Portugal, and Spain into the EU – further expanded EU 
cohesion  policy,  and  more  particularly  increased  the  size  of  cohesion  funding,  with  these 
relatively  poorer  countries  tying  cohesion  policy  to  their  cooperation  on  those  EU  policy 
                                                           
3   S. Hoffmann, Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe, Daedalus, 
95, 1966, pp. 862-915. 
4   A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 1998. 
5   R.A.W. Rhodes, Regional Policy and a „Europe of the Regions‟: A Critical Assessment, Regional Studies, Vol. 
8, No. 2, 1974, pp. 105-114. 7 
 
initiatives wealthier countries supported. The accessions of Finland and Sweden as part of the 
1995  enlargement  led  to  the  inclusion  of  sparsely  populated  areas  as  a  separate  component 
element of cohesion policy. Finally, the 10+2 enlargement of 2004-07 presented a number of 
interrelated cohesion policy challenges, with most of the new member states displaying: per 
capita GNI well below the EU-15 average; inefficient industries (a legacy of communism); a lack 
of  knowledge-industries;  and  the  movement  of  workers  from  industry  to  rural  employment 
and/or unemployment as state-owned factories began to close or privatize. The sheer magnitude 
of the disparity in regional income and infrastructure between the EU-15 and the EU-12 opened 
a  window  of  opportunity  for  the  broadening,  and  more  particularly  the  „Lisbonization‟,  of 
cohesion policy.  
For  intergovernmentalists,  cohesion  policy  is  thus  essentially  an  example  of  „side 
payments‟, in which the richer and more competitive member states assuage the poorer and less 
competitive states with budgetary monetary transfers.
6 To put this another way, cohesion side 
payments are part of an elaborate system of „costs‟ in which the richer and more competitive 
member states „compensate‟ the poorer and less competitive member states for opening-up their 
markets  to  trade  and  outside  investment.  Cohesion  policy  may  in  one  phase  focus  on  de-
industrialisation  in  the  UK  and  in  another  ageing  industrial  plants  and  weak  transportation 
infrastructure in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), but the rationale is the 
same:  weaker  member  states  extract  budgetary  transfers  from  those  richer  countries  – 
particularly Germany – which stand to profit the most from the enlarged internal market. Thus, 
this pure form of intergovernmentalism interprets cohesion policy as an elaborate game of side 
payments.  
                                                           
6   G. Marks, Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC, in: A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (eds.), The 
State of the European Community, Boulder, Lynn Rienner, 1993, pp. 391-410, p. 393. 8 
 
But does intergovernmentalism really provide a wholly convincing explanation of the 
importance  of  cohesion  policy?  Several  objections  can  be  made  to  its  claimed  explanatory 
capacities, of which three are now briefly outlined so as to demonstrate the limitations of the 
approach. The first objection is a broad-based criticism that rests on a rejection of the notion that 
the  EU  is  best  viewed  as  an  inter-state  system.  Rather,  for  many  scholars  coming  from  a 
comparative politics perspective the EU is a „polity‟ invested with a constitutional architecture.
7 
The EU‟s treaties, legislation, policy actors and policy processes mimic what happens in states 
more than they do what happens in the anarchic international system. Hence, cohesion policy 
should  be  studied  with  intrastate  tools  rather  than  through  intergovernmental  approaches.  A 
second criticism is that intergovernmentalism tells us little about the motivations of key policy 
actors in particular policy situations, and so in the particular context of cohesion policy does not 
explain  how  it  is  that  rich  and  powerful  states  would  agree  to  a  policy  based  on  transfer 
payments. There are other options for constructing budgetary revenues and expenses to favour 
marginalised, struggling states.  A third criticism  is that  whilst  intergovernmentalism  may be 
useful  in  helping  to  explain  high-level  EU  decision-taking,  it  is  of  very  limited  value  in 
explaining the day-to-day functioning of EU policy-making. So, in the case of cohesion policy, 
intergovernmental critics suggest that the role of supranational institutions – and in particular the 
role of the Commission – is not limited to policy implementation but extends to all stages of the 
policy-making process, including policy formulation and policy proposing.  
Intergovernmentalists have responded to these criticisms in a number of ways, but none is 
arguably wholly convincing. So, the most common response to the third criticism is the adopting 
                                                           
7   S. Hix, The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics, West European Politics, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1-30.  9 
 
of delegation or principal-agent theory,
8 which results in the argument that the  supranational 
authority  of bodies such as the Commission  is illusory: the Commission is an  agent  of the 
member  states  in  the  same  way  that  traditional  public  administration  theory  has  seen  civil 
servants as the „agents‟ of elected officials and their appointees. But, there are weaknesses in this 
„defence‟ for whilst principal-agent theory may be useful for explaining the importance of some 
types of policies it is not useful for others. So, as studies dating from the 1980s in United States‟ 
federal practice suggest,
9 principal-agent theory is indeed a useful model to frame delegation in 
respect of regulatory and monetary policies. In the former, legislators do not wish to be blamed 
by  powerful  business  interests  when  they  regulate  for  market  failure,  whilst  in  the  latter 
legislators are unable to resist populist inflationary policies: hence, the  creation of  regulatory 
agencies and central banks – which may be theoretically independent but which in practice must 
operate  within  frameworks  determined  by  the  principals.  But,  principal-agent  theory  is  less 
useful for explaining redistributive policies because these motives do not hold. Redistributive 
policies are developed to mitigate the gulf between haves and have-nots rather than to regulate 
the actions of powerful societal interests – with regions substituting for 'class‟ in EU cohesion 
policy. Redistributive policies need not be individual-based, but can involve transfers from the 
central to  regional governments. So, for example, in the US the federal government utilizes 
'block grants' to redistribute funds from Washington to the state capitals. The states‟ executive 
branches then, in turn, redistribute these block grant funds throughout their states. Accordingly, 
the  territorial-dimension  of  cohesion  policy  will  break  the  neat  principal-agent  relationship, 
simply because a territorially-based policy sets up a quasi-federal relationship.  In essence, two 
                                                           
8   See  M.  Pollack,  Regional  Actors  in  an  Intergovernmental  Play:  The  Making  and  Implementation  of  EC 
Structural Policy, in: S. Mazey and C. Rhodes (eds.), The State of the European Union, Vol. 3: Building a 
European Polity?, Boulder, Lynne Rienne, 1995. 
9   M. Pollack, Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation, West 
European Politics,Vol. 25, No. 1, 2002, pp. 200-219. 10 
 
sets of actors – in this case the Commission and the national agencies making the distributive 
decisions  –  have  wide  latitude  in  their  decisions  regarding  the  criteria  for  determining  the 
distribution of cohesion funds. Muddying the clarity of the delegation chain is that sub-national 
units  (using  the  term  loosely  in  the  EU's  case),  too,  can  have  a  great  deal  of  leeway  in 
determining the distribution of funds within their territorial boundaries, again, setting off a round 
of competition among the local governments and non-governmental actors (such as non-profit 
agencies) which seek a share of these funds.  
Another, and more specific, criticism of the usefulness of the principal-agent approach in 
respect of explaining the importance of cohesion policy is that sometimes the Commission is 
viewed as the agent and other times as the principal. So, for example, the Council (working with 
the EP, post the Lisbon Treaty) acts as the principal in the taking of major cohesion policy 
decisions  (though  not  necessarily  in  the  formulation  of  them),  delegating  agency  to  the 
Commission. But, at the policy implementation stage roles reverse: the Commission becomes the 
principal to the agency member states.  Is it possible to pinpoint when these roles reverse, and, if 
so, would not the role reversal alter the Commission‟s perception of its roles, particularly of 
agency?   
 
2.2 Multi-level Governance  
Beginning with Marks‟ analysis of structural funds
10 (1993), the now much-used concept 
of multilevel governance has been built to a considerable degree on the empirical base of EU 
cohesion policy. Though MLG is more of a descriptive than an explanatory device – in that its 
main purpose is to describe structural aspects of the operation of the EU – it does offer the most 
                                                           
10   G. Marks, Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC, in: A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (eds.), The 
State of the European Community, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1993, pp. 391-410. 11 
 
serious challenge in the existing literature to the intergovernmental approach in explaining the 
development of cohesion policy.  
An important aspect of  MLG theory is that sub-national levels of government, when 
acting as agents to the federal or central government, work sometimes in extended time horizons 
(such  as  when  managing  multi-year  grants)  and  often  with  considerable  leeway  in  the 
implementation of policy programmes. In the context of EU cohesion funds, this is seen by MLG 
advocates as greatly empowering sub-national governments and taking them in some respects 
beyond  a  role  that  is  confined  to  that  of  implementing  agencies.  They  are  seen  to  both 
accumulate and provide the Commission with much-needed information to improve the use of 
structural funds and also to work actively to influence the Commission in promulgating policy of 
benefit to their regions – even if this means circumventing the national government‟s traditional 
gatekeeping role.    
Hence, MLG EU policy processes operate within a tangled web of vertical federalism 
(Type 1), horizontal federalism (Type 2), and policy networks. Responsibility shifts among the 
actors according to the particular project, capacity to deliver, and so forth. Flat networks replace 
hierarchical, centralised policy-making.  Cohesion policy evolves and is shaped by these forces. 
But, notwithstanding all of the multi-level activity, a central problem for MLG has been 
in closing the circle between regional power and the shaping of cohesion policy. In a recent 
comprehensive analysis of MLG theory, Piattoni
11 captures the essence of the empirical dilemma 
MLG adherents face in explaining cohesion policy: 
By drawing attention to the policy (emphasis in original), MLG theorist could 
effectively counter the intergovernmentalist polity (emphasis in original) claims: 
the central governments of member-states might well have decided framework 
regulations and financial envelopes, but the Commission had reserved for itself 
ample room to decide the terms of fund disbursement, and had requested to this 
end the collaboration of regional and local governments, social patterns, and 
                                                           
11   S. Piattoni, The Theory of Multi-Level Governance, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 105-106. 12 
 
organized civil society…By shifting the level of discourse, Marks and the others 
certainly  won  a  battle,  but  also  committed  themselves  to  prove  that  policy 
dynamics  accumulate and  escalate  into  policy  transformations,  and  this  is a 
much tougher test (our emphasis). 
 
So while studies have documented the large number and variety of sub-national governments and 
societal actors involved in the implementation of cohesion policy –
12 it is another matter to make 
the leap of faith that their involvement has made an appreciable difference in the evolution of 
cohesion  policy.  MLG-informed  work  has  uncovered  independence  on  the  part  of  the 
Commission –
13 a core prediction of neo-functionalist theory – but scholars focusing on various 
countries have reported that the EU‟s member states are firmly in control of the process and that 
regional entities react to rather than formulate policy.
14   
In sum,  MLG has been unable to produce evidence as to the bottom -up nature of  the 
evolution and shaping  EU‟s cohesion policy. Hence, MLG likely mistakes multi-level activity 
for multi-level governance. To put this into a comparative perspective, horizontal federalism is 
underdeveloped in  all  federal systems  because  of the  complexity in  both  understanding  and 
implementing these arrangements. Indeed, federalism scholars have noted that inter-unit efforts 
to deal with issues of wide scope without the participation of the federal government („federalism 
without Bern/Berlin/Washington‟) are „generally of limited success‟ because of their confederal 
character.
15 Nevertheless, MLG – by identifying and recognising numerous territorially-based 
                                                           
12  See,  for  example,  L.  Hooghe  and  G.  Marks,  Multilevel  Governance  and  European  Integration,  Lanham, 
Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 
13   L. Hooghe, Building a Europe with the Regions: The Changing Role of the European Commission, in: Liesbet 
Hooghe (ed.), Cohesion Policy and European  Integration: Building Multilevel Governance, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996, pp. 89-127 and G. Marks, An Actor-Centered Approach to Multi-level Governance, 
Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1996, pp. 20-40. 
14   I. Bache, Europeanization and Multilevel Governance, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 2008; C. 
Jeffery,  Sub-National  Mobilization  and  European  Integration:  Does  it  Make  Any  Difference?,  Journal  of 
Common Market Studies,Vol. 38, No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-23; P. McAleavy, The Politics of the European Regional 
Development Policy: Additionality and the Scottish Coalfields, Regional Politics and Policy, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
1993, pp. 88-107. 
15   See R.L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Kingston, Ontario, Institute of Intergovernmental 
Relations, Queen's University, 1997, p. 53 on the inherent difficulties of managing horizontal federalism. 13 
 
actors – offers a more realistic understanding of the continuous and complex bargaining found in 
federal  arrangements  than  intergovernmentalism/delegation  theory.  We  will  pick  up  on  this 
strand (Type 1) of MLG in the next section of the paper. 
 
3. Using a Federal Integration Approach to Explain EU Cohesion Policy 
It is now nearly half a century since Haas and Schmitter famously asked:   
Does  the  economic  integration  of  a  group  of  nations  automatically  trigger 
political unity? Or are these two processes quite distinct, requiring deliberate 
political steps because purely economic arrangements are generally inadequate 
for ushering in political unity?
16  
 
They advanced the thesis that „under modern conditions, the relationship between economic and 
political union had best be treated as a continuum‟ meaning that  
[…]  definite  political  implications  can  be  associated  with  most  movements 
toward  economic  integration  even  when  the  chief  actors  themselves  do  not 
entertain such notions at the time of adopting their new constitutive charter.
17 
 
It is hard to quarrel with this observation, but explaining the phenomenon has proven elusive. 
Notwithstanding the early recognitions of the importance of looking at both political and 
economic factors in integration models, over the years single discipline-based approaches have 
tended to prevail. So, for the most part, political scientists have not much emphasized the many 
economic factors constraining political decisions while economists have tended to minimize the 
significance  of  political  variables.  This  impermeableness  of  single  disciple-based  theoretical 
work  can  be  explained  to  some  extent  by  the  different  instruments  political  scientists  and 
economists  utilize  in  scholarly  inquiry,  but  also  by  the  questions  they  pose.  Economists 
analysing the integration process tend to be mainly concerned with the optimum conditions for 
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achieving economic efficiency, while political scientists are mostly focused on such matters as 
institutional and policy-making arrangements and the power relations between political actors.  
So while these two branches of inquiry have contributed significantly to our understanding of 
European integration and policy development, there has been an insufficient attempt to develop 
explanatory  models  that  blend  both  the  economic  and  political  components  of  European 
integration.  
In this section of the paper we suggest an approach to explaining the evolution and nature 
of the EU‟s policy portfolio, and especially EU cohesion policy, that draws on both economic 
and  political  science-based  thinking.  It  takes  into  account  both  the  compelling  economic 
efficiency of integration and the nature of political relationships and motives. The key questions 
we  seek  to  cover  are:  in  what  circumstances  and  when  do  economic  considerations  drive 
integration?;  in  what  circumstances  and  when  do  political  considerations  trump  economic 
arguments?; and are „real world‟ politics and economics so overlapping and intermingled as to 
defy individual analysis? The approach that we suggest draws on economic integration theory 
and federal theory. 
 
3.1 Economic integration theory 
Bela  Balassa‟s
18  theory  of  economic  integration  has  been  highly  influential  in 
understanding the sequencing of European integration. His model evolved from the free trade 
tradition among neoclassical economists
19 but introduced a dynamic element and set of logica l 
explanations to a non-economic audience. Balassa articulated a stage-based model (depicted in 
Table 1) in which economic integration would proceed via a predictable path of stages marked 
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by increased integration. So, for example, the common market could be achieved once both the 
free  trade  area  and  the  customs  union  had  been  established.  Moving  forward  in  the  model, 
cohesion  policy  would  come  into  play  under  „economic  union‟;  hence,  the  common  market 
would need to be achieved before progress could be made on the policies comprising „economic 
union‟.  
Balassa‟s model is thus first and foremost a theory of economic integration. It predicts 
that once member states choose the path of economic integration, economic determinism comes 
into play, carrying members toward a point of no return with economic dependence in one area 
triggering the necessity for economic integration in another. Although not a perfect fit, we can 
see in Table 1 how the succession of EU treaties line up with the consecutive phases of the 
Balassian Model, with the EEC Treaty addressing the first two stages, and each subsequent treaty 
focussed on policies associated with subsequent stages of integration.  
Building on the work of Jan Tinbergen,
20 Balassa thought that the first three phases of economic 
integration would entail member state removal of artificial barriers to the fou r freedoms – what 
Tinbergen had called „negative integration‟ – while subsequent stages would be characterised by 
„positive integration‟, requiring governmental policies and enabling institutional structures. Over 
the years, as the economic approach has been tested in the laboratory of European integration, 
we have learned that the separation of policy into such a neat dichotomy of negative and positive 
vastly  underestimates  the  importance  of  politics.  An  obvious  weakness  of  the  economic 
integration  model  lies  in  the  unfinished  internal  market  project,  especially  as  it  pertains  to 
services, the right of establishment, and free movement of persons (where the Schengen opt-outs 
are a particular problem). 
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Table 1: Balassa's Theoretical Evolution of Political and Economic Integration 
  Removal of 
Internal Tariffs 
Common 
External Tariff 
  
Free Flow of 
Capital and 
Labour 
Harmonization  
of  Social, Economic & 
Sectoral  
Policies 
Monetary  & Fiscal 
Union  
(Economic 
Federalism) 
Political 
Integration 
Free Trade Area  
EEC Treaty (1957) 
X           
Customs Union  
 EEC Treaty (1957) 
X  X         
Common Market  
Single European Act 
(1986) 
X  X  X       
Economic Union 
Single European Act 
(1986) & all 
subsequent treaties 
X  X  X       
Economic Federalism 
Treaty on Economic 
Union (1992) 
X  X  X  X  X   
Political Union 
Treaty on Economic 
Union (1992) & all 
subsequent treaties 
X  X  X  X  X  X 17 
 
Many of the reasons why the Balassian model has not wholly „worked‟ in the EU
21 can 
be  traced  to  disagreements  amongst  policy  actors  as  to  the  role  of  the  state  in  advancing 
successive economic stages. Rather than an inexorable march once economic integration was 
launched, both negative integration and the policies entailing positive integration promulgated in 
subsequent stages in the Balassian model have proved to be highly difficult to attain and have 
included  protracted  and  gruelling  policy-making.  So,  the  EU  has  attempted  a  number  of 
approaches to open-up its market – based, for example, on harmonization, mutual recognition, 
and agencification – but there has been considerable resistance in some areas of activity. The 
right  of  establishment  has  been  just  one  problem,
22 with differential professional licensure 
requirements severely limiting free movement and with,  in many cases, remedies originating 
outside of  formal  EU decision-making process:  one example being the  Bologna Process for 
educational standards and another, the work of international standards agencies. 
Given these weaknesses in the predictive capacity of the Balass ian model, one could 
reasonably ask, „How does Balassa‟s model differ from neofunctionalism or its „rebranding‟ as 
„supranationalism‟? In essence, what is the value-added to our understanding of the dynamic of 
integration by the economic approach? Admittedly, economic integration and neofunctionalist 
approaches resemble each other in the earlier stages of integration in so much as both suggest 
that once integration occurs in particular economic sectors it „spills over‟ into other sectors and, 
eventually, entails political spillover. But, whilst Balassa identifies economic factors as catalysts 
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for further integration, Sweet and Sandholtz,
23 building from a largely neofunctionalist base, 
suggest  that  „transnational  exchange  provokes  supranational  organizations  to  make  rules 
designed to facilitate and to regulate the development of transnational society‟. So while it is 
evident  that  in  the  common  market  stage  the  Balassaian  model  begins  to  lose  some  of  its 
explanatory power, it continues to offer an underlying direction and linkage through economic 
theory. 
This paper is mainly concerned with the „economic union‟ stage because it is in this 
phase that cohesion policy should come into play. Economic union ushers in a new „positive‟ 
phase of economic integration, where the member states must affirmatively promulgate policy 
rather than „merely‟ strike down man-made barriers to the free circulation of goods, services, 
persons, and capital. This stage is associated with the harmonisation of key sectoral policies – 
such as agriculture, fishing, transportation, and energy – and with the health and well-being of 
citizens – in the form, for example of consumer protection, environment, and health care.   
Policy-wise, this is a particularly complex stage of the model, encompassing as it does all 
three  of  Lowi‟s
24 policy  deliberation  types  –  distributive  (as  in  agricultural  and  research 
policies),  redistributive  (as  in  cohesion,  social  welfare,  employment  training,  and  education 
policies), and regulatory (as in environmental and food safety policies). And whilst in the first 
three  stages  of  integration  policies  are  easily  linked  to  the  interrelated  goals  of  achieving 
European-wide efficiencies in production and marketing, the policy level problem familiar to 
federal arrangements begins to assert itself at the economic union stage. The EU has largely 
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escaped  the  social  welfare  debate  between  the  public  choice  school
25 and social democrat 
preferences, due largely to the fact that economic liberal parties in EU member states have only 
been able to govern as minority coalition partners. On social issues, t he Social Democratic and 
Conservative/Confessional Parties in postwar Continental Europe agreed to generous safety nets.  
Thus, the almost complete absence from the EU of social welfare policies is likely too complex 
for the elegant simplicity of the  Balassian model. This is because unlike other integration 
projects, the EU had the advantage in the early stages of its development of a similarity in policy 
approaches. So, in this respect, a union of values and norms existed prior to the establishment of 
the EU, thus diminishing the need for some EU-level policies and making the EU something of 
an outlier in this aspect of the Balassa model.  
Agricultural and fisheries policies – which are the most prominent of the EU‟s sectoral 
policies – were enacted years before the completion of the internal market, which further calls 
into the question the predictive accuracy of the Balassa model. There are a number of possible 
explanations for the divergence of theory and practice and it may be that particularistic/policy-
specific explanations are the best that we can achieve. So, for instance, the early enactment of the 
CAP might be best explained by the immediate post-war experiences of food shortages rather 
than the Balassian logic.
26 In sum,  the early appearance  of agricultural policy  on the policy 
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agenda may be explained by highly specific historical circumstances and, therefore, should not 
be interpreted as a challenge to the predictive capability of the Balassian model. 
Turning to our policy case study, Balassa
27 had predicted the necessity of cohesion policy in 
regional integration in the economic union stage, arguing that:   
Common  markets  take  up  the  issue  of  regional  disparities  because  free 
movement  of  factors  might,  in  a  combination  of  ways:  1)  disproportionately 
benefit  wealthy  regions  by  inducing  labour  and  capital  to  flow  towards 
agglomerated industry; 2) disproportionately benefit poorer regions by – largely 
in response to wage differentials – increasing demand for the underdeveloped 
regions‟ products, attracting capital and labour, and encouraging the relocation 
of plants. 
 
Can integration injure both rich and poor regions, as  Balassa suggests? This is the essential 
debate informing cohesion policy, with economists particularly concerned to discover whether 
redistribution  is  ameliorative  or  injurious  to  the  Union.  It  is  a  debate  that  has  become 
increasingly  important  over  the  years,  not  least  in  light  of  the  „Lisbonization‟  of  cohesion 
policy,
28 which links cohesion funds to sustainable growth, competitiveness and employment.
29   
Much of this economic  debate is  conditioned by disparate premises and assumptions 
concerning the nature of and the time-scales involved in economic convergence and divergence. 
Neo-liberals  embrace  the  positive  benefits  of  divergence  for  industrial  competition  and 
emphasize  the long-run  tendency  toward  convergence,  while  social  democrats  and  critical 
political economists see divergence as a permanent feature in which the wealthier regions exploit 
poorer regions.    
For neo-liberals, inter-regional disparities in wealth, labour costs, technology, and safety 
standards (such as environmental protection) are a natural outcome of a region‟s competitive 
advantage in one or more of the four factors of production.  Indeed, when companies relocate to 
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lower  wage  regions,  higher-skilled  labour  in  more  technologically-advanced  regions  can  be 
shifted to the production of more innovative goods and services. Similarly, a region with higher 
rates of entrepreneurship (innovative products) will eventually lose its dominance to imitators in 
regions with transportation and labour cost advantages.
30 Accordingly, neo-liberals have long 
predicted that the expansion of the single market inevitably will reduce inter-state poverty.   
Conversely, social democrats see an internal market initiating a race  to the bottom in 
which weaker regulatory regimes in the less-developed regions attract companies fleeing stricter 
governmental regulations designed to minimize market failur e.
31 So for example, lower labour 
costs in some regions will advantage owners over  workers in labour negotiations, placing 
downward  pressure  on  labour  rates  in  richer  member  states .
32 To  social  democrats,  then, 
divergence is corrosive and permanent, requiring affirmative policy action to level the playing 
field between rich and poor regions.   
The social democratic view figured in early deliberations of economic and monetary 
union (EMU). This was the case because as the EEC started out on the path to EMU, businesses 
and governments in weaker regions could be expected to experience difficulties adjusting to 
tighter control (and centralisation) of fiscal and monetary policies. Hence, the 1 970 Werner 
Report recommended the implementation of structural and regional policies to soften the impact 
of EMU
33 and when it was made clear in the Maastricht Treaty that EMU was imminent, a  new 
cohesion fund was agreed.  More recently,  „the Lisbonization‟ of cohesion policy can also be 
interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  finesse  the  convergence-divergence  question  by  placing 
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competitiveness and growth as core objectives. This view has also found its way into the MLG 
literature. In his original formulation of MLG, Marks observes:
34 
[…] governments in the poorer countries make a convincing case that they face 
a particular severe economic risk as a result of the twin pressures of Europe-
wide economic competition and attempts to meet EMU convergence criteria. 
Further, it seems sensible to argue that an economic downturn stands to hurt a 
poorer country more than one that is richer, because the welfare safety net of a 
poorer country is weaker. 
 
Under  Balassa‟s  model,  cohesion  policy  would  have  been  expected  to  attract  attention  as 
European integration advanced, and he was correct: cohesion policy came into its own in the 
1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, there is little in his model to indicate what the direction or nature 
of the policy would be. More specifically, there certainly is nothing in his model to suggest that 
cohesion would become so prominent a policy area.  Furthermore, there is little in economic 
analysis more generally that makes a clear case for the economic benefits of the use of re-
distributive cohesion funding. There just is no commonly accepted set formula for determining 
when and under what  circumstances  the use of targeted cohesion  funding will advantage or 
disadvantage regions. On the contrary, indeed, measuring the effectiveness of cohesion funding 
policy  effectiveness  –  particularly  in  such  areas  as  transportation  infrastructure  and  human 
resource development, linked as they are to macro-indicators – has proven elusive. While there 
has been no shortage of studies attempting to measure the multiplier effects of cohesion funds – 
utilizing a variety of methods such as econometric models, qualitative analyses, and counter-
factual  assessments  (a type of  quasi-experimental  design in  which a control  group does not 
receive funding – all manner of results are reported: positive, negative, and neutral.
35 
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To take just one example of „the questionable‟ economic effects of cohesion funding, the 
Cohesion Fund which was created by the Maastricht Treaty had as its core aim assisting the 
weak economies of Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal in their transition to the single currency 
and the strictures of the Stability and Growth Pact. But the recent monetary and fiscal pressures 
on these four recipient states, and especially the near collapse of the Greek and Irish economic 
and financial systems, would seem to rather undermine the credibility of cohesion policy as an 
economic stabilization programme. The safe bet would appear to be to admit that we simply do 
not know the economic impact of cohesion policy.  
So why, given the lack of conclusive evidence that cohesion policy, and more particularly 
cohesion funding policy, elevates, or even much compensates, disadvantaged regions, does it 
continue as a firmly established policy? After all, there are numerous competing claims for the 
EU‟s limited budgetary resources. 
In seeking to answer this question, it is clear that, useful though it may be, economic 
integration theory cannot be a wholly „stand alone‟ theory for explaining the nature of the EU‟s 
policy portfolio. This is seen in the many ways that EU policy development has not completely 
followed the path foreseen by Balassa and his followers. So, for example, under the economic 
integration model, monetary union and fiscal union should proceed alongside one another, but in 
the EU they have not done so. In consequence of this, today, during Europe‟s worst post-war 
financial and economic crisis, a crescendo of voices is questioning the wisdom of the EU, or at 
least of most of its member states, having adopted monetary union without fiscal union.
36  
Arguably, this lack of parallelism between monetary and fiscal union has occurred 
because, despite the seemingly inexorable nature of economic integration, politics has a way of 
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derailing „rational‟ economics. So, in spite of the unfinished common market project – as seen, 
for example, in the way in which energy, transportation, and services still largely operate under 
national rules and enjoy domestic protection – member states formed the eurozone:  a later stage 
of  the  economic  integration  model.  Similarly,  over  the  last  decade  or  so  there  has  been 
considerable EU policy development in the field of justice and home affairs (political union), 
which  has  „leapfrogged‟  such  key  features  of  economic  federalism  as  the  creation  of  a 
harmonized base for corporate taxation.  
Economic integration theory in itself is thus not sufficiently equipped to be able to fully 
explain how national and EU policy-makers and societal actors have conditioned and shaped EU 
policy development. It needs to be supplemented by a political input.  
 
Federal Theory 
There has long been an interest amongst some European political  practitioners in the 
attractions and merits of building European integration with federalist tools and mechanisms. 
Indeed, during World War II opponents of fascism looked forward to a United States of Europe 
with a federalist institutional architecture that would eliminate the possibility of future European 
„civil wars‟. The post-war federal movement can be traced to Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, 
who while interned by Mussolini co-authored the Ventotene Manifesto – „Towards a Free and 
United Europe‟ – which proposed a federal system united by a federal constitution.  
But,  though  widely  accepted  in  Resistance  circles,  the  federal  approach  to  building 
European integration ran-up against a number of obstacles when „normal politics‟ re-emerged 
after World War II. Kenneth Wheare
37 identified experience in governing as key to the successful 
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establishment of federal states (because they require skilled negotiators at the helm) but, as Tony 
Judt
38 has reminded us, „by 1945 many continental European countries had lost two generations 
of potential leaders: the first to death and injury in the Great War, the second to the temptation of 
Fascism  or  else  to  murder  at  the  hands  of  Nazis  and  their  friends‟.  Another  problem  with 
Resistance-inspired  hopes  and  beliefs  that  European  statesmen  could  draft  a  constitution  for 
Europe was that it flew in the face of a basic prerequisite of federal union, namely that „states 
must have experience of some political association of states concerned prior to their federal 
union either in loose confederation, as with the American states and the Swiss cantons, or as 
parts of the same Empire, as with the Canadian and Australian colonies‟.
39 This absence of a past 
history of political association  resulted in attachments to national sovereignty being, in some 
states more than others, blocking instruments to  embarking on  an openly  European federalist 
road in the post-war years.  
In consequence, Monnet‟s more conservative and functionalist approach to integration 
was adopted. But, it was an approach that, almost by stealth, was not wholly divorced from 
federalism, as a number of commentators have noted. Elazar,
40 for example, has observed that 
the EEC  was established as „in effect, confederal arrangements, based on functionalism‟ as a 
„way out‟ of the post-war governance crisis. And Pinder
41 has suggested that „the constitutional 
federalism of Spinelli and functional federalism of Monnet can be seen to be complementary‟. 
On Pinder‟s point, it is certainly the case that Monnet‟s approach to integration was rooted in 
policy while Spinelli‟s lifelong ambition was to build federal institutions as part of establishing 
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constitutional federalism in Europe – and the founding treaties did create at least quasi-federal 
institutions.  
So, federalism has long had a place in the history of European integration, and has come 
to do so increasingly as the integration process has resulted in an almost constant expansion of 
the EU‟s policy portfolio and of the powers of the EU-level institutions. The word „federal‟ may 
not be much used by EU politicians, but the fact is that though the EU falls short of being a pure 
federal system (if there is such a thing!) it does  now display key federal features: power is 
divided  between  national  and  sub-national  levels,  with  each  level  having  responsibility  for 
important and significant policy areas; there is a considerable measure of political and legal 
independence between the two levels; and a legal system is established in which the central law 
is supreme in the event of a clash between it and regional (which means national in the EU‟s 
case) law. 
The argument for the employment of federal theory to European integration studies – and 
thus expanding the sample size from one (the sui generis nature of the EU) to all federal systems 
(historical and contemporary) – is thus persuasive. So persuasive in fact, that it has produced a 
burgeoning  literature  in  recent  years,  with  European  integration  studies  informed  by  federal 
theory  having  addressed  a  wide  variety  of  matters:  institutions;
42 the polity;
43 power-sharing 
dynamics;
44 policies;
45 and the virtues of comparison.
46 
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A good place to begin our quest to examine cohesion policy from a federalist perspective 
is with a snapshot of the policy areas in which the EU plays some role. Table 2, which is based  
on Nugent‟s
47 analysis, categorizes EU policy involvement on a continuum from extensive EU to 
virtually no EU policy involvement. There is no question but that this table shows a few policy 
areas that in established federal systems are mostly handled by the central level of decision-
making which in the EU are more of a mixed competence between the central and sub-national 
levels. The most obvious of such areas are foreign policy, defence policy, and macroeconomic 
and monetary policies (though there is, of course, a common monetary policy for the seventeen 
eurozone member states). But, notwithstanding these differences, looking at the overall picture it 
is  striking  how  many  points  of  similarity  there  are  in  terms  of  the  allocation  of  policy 
responsibilities  between  the  two  levels  of  government  in  the  EU  and  in  traditional  federal 
systems. Taking, just a few illustrative examples of this:  
-  Giandomenico Majone,
48 in his work examining the EU as a regulatory state, has drawn 
explicit  parallels  between  the  policy  outputs  of  the  EU  and  of  the  US  federal 
government. Building on Majone‟s work, Kelemen (2004)
49 has taken a similar view in 
his advancement of a theory of regulatory federalism. 
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- A number of scholars have pointed to the federal characteristics of environmental and 
even some aspects of energy policy.
50 Buchan,
51 for example, has written of EU energy 
policy: „By way of comparison with another federal system, the Commission will come 
closer to getting a standard electricity-market design for the twenty-seven EU member 
states than the US federal authorities have done with the fifty states‟. Energy policy is 
thus one of a number of policy areas where it is evident that EU policy is sometimes 
more federalized than the federal system to which it is most often compared, namely the 
United States.
52  
- College tuition is another example of a policy area that is more federalized than in the 
US, with the European Court of Justice  having prohibited differential tuition rates for 
EU citizens as a violation of free movement of persons . In the US, public universities 
typically charge higher tuition for out-of-state residents.  
- Zeroing in at  the granular level of policy -making, the EU has even mandated the 
standardisation of mobile phone power cords,
53 while the US has not.  
- Taking those (relatively few) policy areas that in Table 2 are categorized by limited or 
virtually no EU policy involvement, they are almost invariably the same policies that in 
„full‟ federal systems are the responsibility of sub-national levels of government.
54 
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So this much we know: the EU‟s policy portfolio displays strong federalist features. How does 
cohesion policy fit into this picture and, more particularly, to what extent can its prominent 
position in the portfolio be explained by it being a „federalizing‟ policy? 
Here, the federal dimension of our federal integration model is useful because „federal 
relations‟ and „federal behaviour‟ may be deemed more important to EU goals than unconfirmed 
and increasingly diluted (by enlargement) claims that cohesion policy undermines the economic 
efficiency effects of the single market. There appear to be at least three aspects of cohesion 
policy that support the application of federal theory.   
Table 2: The Varying Extent of EU Policy Involvement 
Extensive EU 
involvement 
Considerable 
EU involvement 
Policy responsibilities 
shared between the EU 
and the member states 
 
Limited EU 
policy involvement 
Virtually no EU 
policy 
involvement 
External trade 
 
Agriculture  
 
Fishing 
 
Monetary (for 
euro members ) 
Market regulation 
 
Competition 
 
     
Regional/Cohesion 
 
Industry 
 
Foreign 
Environment 
 
Equal opportunities 
 
Working conditions 
 
Consumer protection 
 
Movement across external 
borders 
 
Macroeconomic (especially 
for Euro members) 
 
Energy 
 
Transport 
 
Cross-border crime 
 
Civil Liberties (especially 
via the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights) 
 
Health 
 
Education 
 
Defence 
 
Social welfare 
 
Housing 
 
Domestic  crime 
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First, cohesion policy offers the EU (the „central government‟) an opportunity to take 
credit  for  economic  development  within  those member  states  qualifying  for  cohesion  funds. 
Hence,  we  have  Allen‟s
55 observation  that  Ireland  „had  been  transformed  with  the  help  of 
structural and cohesion  funding to the extent that it became ineligible for them‟, when it is 
equally possible that other variables better explain Ireland‟s economic miracle – low corporate 
taxes, foreign direct investment (mainly from the US), return of Irish-Americans (tourism, real 
estate),  and  a  highly-educated  English  speaking  population.
56 The  EU  can  „claim‟  credit  for 
economic success in Ireland and elsewhere because no one can definitively prove that cohesion 
policy has not been responsible for economic growth and development. Indeed, the Commission 
claims that „GDP in the EU25 as a whole is estimated to have been 0.7% higher in 2009 as a 
result  of  cohesion  policy  over  the  2000/2006  period  –  meaning  a  good  return  for  spending 
accounting for less than 0.5% of the EU GDP over the same period‟.
57  
One of the characteristics of federal systems is a direct link between the citizens and both 
the central and sub-national levels of government. EU cohesion policy is connected to the need 
for the EU central level to develop direct linkages with societal actors and thus help to promote a 
European polity. By necessity, these links are utilitarian, but if cohesion policy can assist in the 
EU being seen to be a  „good thing‟ this should promote a sense of identification with the EU 
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EU  Budget  Review,  Brussels,  2010,  p.  6,  retrieved  from  http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/library/ 
communication/com_2010_700_en.pdf. 31 
 
level.
58 Hence, cohesion policy is a tool to promote solidarity and shared id entity among the 
European polity. That any EU -funded project must display the EU flag provides a powerful 
iconic symbol to anyone  who passes by an EU-funded construction site or vocational training 
centre. Of course, with credit also comes blame , with the now familiar „Blame it on Brussels‟ 
habit
59 being equivalent to a feature of all federal (especially dualist) systems – „Running against 
Washington‟ being the US counterpart.   
Second, cohesion policy involves the redistribution of resources on a territorial basis – a 
practice that is found in all federal systems and may be said to be virtually a federal requirement. 
Watts
60 suggests that financial transfers from the federal government to its regions are necessary 
to correct  two types of imbalances – vertical (constitutionally-assigned revenues collected by 
federal and regional levels do not match constitutionally-assigned expenditures) and horizontal 
(revenue capacities vary among regions). He observes that „The need for such (equalization) 
transfers arise in most federations from a recognition that disparities in wealth among regions 
within a federation are likely to have a corrosive effect on cohesion within a federation‟.   
Turning  to  our  case  study,  Bache,
61 utilizing  Lowi‟s
62 classification  of  public  policy, 
identifies cohesion policy as „the main redistributive policy of the EU‟.
63 The Commission, in its 
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2010 budgetary review, observes „Cohesion has proved one of the most successful ways for the 
Union to demonstrate its commitment to solidarity, while spreading growth and prosperity across 
the EU‟.
64 Thus, in a policy area in which redistribution of governmental revenue is earmarked 
primarily  for  territorial  units  rather  than  individuals,  the  EU  has  constructed  the  typical 
arrangement  found  in  federal  systems  –  the  political  representatives  of  the  territorial  units 
bargaining for a share of resources.  In the EU‟s case, the political bargaining is carried out 
mainly in the European Council (in respect of MFFs) and in the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament. Implementation – which naturally involves rule-making and monitoring – 
is the Commission‟s responsibility.  
So, taking the US federal system as a basis for comparison, congressmen and senators 
bargain over the allocation of monies from the centre (block grants). Meanwhile, the fifty states 
– and more particularly the executives of the states – acting as unitary governments in their 
relationship with sub-regional units, determine which localities will receive these monies. Using 
our federal integration model as a guide, cohesion policy facilitates federal transfers from the 
centre to the constituent units, binding central (EU) and regional (member states) levels in a 
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makes it difficult to engage in redistributive policies, and, so „bail outs‟ for member states (such as in 2010 with 
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vertical relationship. There is a horizontal dimension as well, because while the implementation 
mechanism flows from the European Commission to member state ministries, cohesion policy 
classifications  are  based  on  shared  regional  characteristics  –  notably  low  per  capita  gross 
national income, high unemployment, poor integration of transportation infrastructure with major 
European metropolitan centres, and sparsely populated territory – rather than being different for 
each member state.   
A  third  commonality  with  federal  practice  is  in  the  tying  of  cohesion  policy  to 
innovation.  One  of  the  benefits  of  federal  systems  is  innovation  in  policy  formulation  and 
implementation  associated  with  multiple  constituencies.
65 In the past decade   or so,  cohesion 
policy  in  federal  systems  has  increasingly  been  tied  to  the  concept  o f  a  „laboratory  of 
democracies‟ wherein – especially in more loosely organised or dual federal systems – cohesion 
policy has moved away from the purely economic logic articulated in the economic integration 
model. In the EU, cohesion policy has also moved in this direction, being re-calibrated to the 
Lisbon Strategy priorities in the 2007-2013 MFF and even further integrated with innovation and 
competition through the Europe 2020 Strategy.
66 EU cohesion projects are now required to be 
innovative, so as to serve as demonstration projects or laboratories of good practice that can then 
be utilised in other localities.   
 It is also relevant to note that the conditionality attached to the use of EU cohesion funds 
– which on first blush might support the intergovernmental/delegation approach – is common to 
all  federal  systems,  albeit  in  varying  degrees.  The  different  levels  of  conditionality  are 
instructive  with  the  US  and  the  EU  at  the  high  end:  the  US  federal  government  attaches 
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conditions to approximately 80% of transfers, whilst Australia attaches them to only 34%.
67 This 
difference can be explained by the commonsense notion that conditionality tends to be lower in 
federations in which the state and provincial legislatures are organized on the parliamentary 
model because of the stronger claim to accountability. In the US separation of powers systems 
with bicameral state legislatures (only Nebraska is unicameral) and a directly-elected governor, 
the federal government has more difficulty in holding state -level units accountable. Again, we 
see a similarity between the EU – itself a system sharing more characteristics of separation of 
powers than the parliamentary mode –
68 and the US, where the EU‟s cohesion policy, too, is 
highly conditional and characterized by rigorous monitoring and accountability requirements.
69   
*** 
So, in conclusion on the federal theory side of our model, t he key point being advanced here is 
that whereas international organizations – groups of cooperating sovereign states – do not have 
cohesion policies, federal systems invariably do. They do so because they are politically useful to 
the federal project. This is so in three main ways, with cohesion policy: providing an opportunity 
to  build  a  direct  relationship  with  the  polity  through  focusing  on  utilitarian  policy-making; 
establishing a territorially-based scheme for promoting equalisation, or at least the appearance 
thereof; and, helping to promote best practices in innovation, growth, and competitiveness. As 
the EU has acquired a quasi-federal character, so has cohesion policy also come to be seen as 
having a similar usefulness for it as it has for established federal systems, and so has the policy 
area been accordingly developed.   
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Conclusion and Future Research 
It has been argued in this paper that a helpful way of explaining the importance of cohesion 
policy in the EU‟s policy portfolio is through a model that links economic integration theory 
with federal theory. Regarding economic integration theory, our key point is that the economic 
approach lays out a (largely) convincing sequencing of integration policies, but cannot account 
for the fact that some policies in the economic union stage have gone forward while others, such 
as transport and energy policy, are still largely the responsibility of the member states.  
As regards cohesion policy, the economic integration model predicts that disparate forces 
are at work – with common markets sometimes producing advantages for wealthy regions and at 
other times producing them for poor regions – which suggests that cohesion policy cannot be 
easily targeted to deal with inequities presumed to arise from integration. Drawing from this 
uncertainty, our argument has been that an economic integration approach cannot fully explain 
the prominence that has been given by the EU over the  years to  cohesion policy. We have 
suggested that cohesion policy appeared in the EU‟s policy portfolio at a relatively early stage 
and has since been developed further than economic integration theory would suggest in large 
part because it is politically useful to the federal project.  
As the ongoing economic and fiscal crisis suggests, it is instructive to note that cohesion 
policy  has  not  been  proven  to  fulfil  its  objectives  in  lifting  recipient  countries  to  a  more 
competitive  level  in  the  EU.  But,  cohesion  policy  continues  to  receive  support  from  EU 
institutions and the member states because it strengthens federal relations by ensuring that richer 
states commit to the redistribution of EU funds to their less well-off partners. The need to use 
both economic and political perspectives to explain cohesion policy is thus seen in the way in 36 
 
which despite the seemingly inexorable nature of economic integration and the usefulness of the 
economic integration model, politics has a way of de-railing „rational‟ policy.   
This  „derailing‟ is  part  of a wider process  in  which the impact  of politics  on policy 
development is not wholly consistent or predictable. In the particular context of federal politics, a 
key feature of federal processes, and of the political, social, and economic forces that shape 
them, is that they are perennially evolving. Power shifts – sometimes slowly and subtly, other 
times quickly and transparently – between the federal government and constituent units.
70 Like 
the Balassian model, federalism is thus a dynamic arrangement.  
The federal integration  approach has been applied  in this paper  to understand a single 
policy area. Future research might expand the  number of cases by identifying  and analysing 
other policy areas in which the EU is engaged that exhibit characteristics of the federal process. 
Examples that come readily to mind and that are very much on the EU‟s current policy agenda 
include food safety, foreign and defence policy, and divorce law (where the EU is attempting to 
ease the complications involved when trans-European marriages break down). 
Adding  a  federal  perspective  to  an  economic  integration  perspective  strengthens  our 
understanding as to why, in spite of the unfinished internal market project, most member states 
„jumped‟ a stage when they formed the eurozone (economic federalism). Similarly,  a federal 
perspective may prove useful in explaining the EU‟s substantive policy development in recent 
years in the field of justice and home affairs (political union), which has „leapfrogged‟ corporate 
taxation (economic federalism). These „departures‟ from the economic determinism implied by 
the economic integration model may arise because the traditional Balassa-based model is not 
equipped to fully explain the way in which national and EU policy-makers and societal actors 
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have conditioned and shaped the integration process. For a more rounded account we need to 
combine a political perspective – and, more particularly, we argue a federal perspective – with 
the model of economic integration.     
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